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Living with Owning 
MATT AMPLEMAN* AND DOUGLAS A. KYSAR† 
In October, 2011, Terry Thompson committed suicide by gunshot after cutting open 
the cages of fifty-six exotic animals on his farm in Zanesville, Ohio. Fearing for pub-
lic safety, law enforcement officers systematically hunted down the escaped animals 
in an episode that garnered international attention and prompted renewed discus-
sion of the propriety of exotic animal ownership. This Article retells and discusses 
the circumstances surrounding Terry Thompson’s unhinging, applying frameworks 
of legal theory, chiefly in the realm of property law, to assess the fabric that held 
Thompson’s delicate system together and the tensions that led to its unravelling. As 
an autopsy, the article documents the systems that failed in theoretical and specific 
terms. After a brief introduction to the law and policy of owning exotic animals, we 
offer a sequence of competing visions for property, stewardship, personhood, gov-
ernance, empathy, and physical ordering or disordering as they apply to the owner-
ship of exotic animals in Ohio. Though Thompson had acquired his menagerie 
through legal means, he resented oversight of government authorities, generating 
friction that reverberated across the lines of tension named above. The Article con-
cludes with discussion of the need—contra Terry Thompson—to surrender control 
in ownership relations, community life, and, ultimately, the modern state.  
  
                                                                                                                 
 
 * J.D. candidate, Yale Law School, expected graduation: May 2017. 
 † Joseph M. Field ‘55 Professor, Yale Law School. This article owes its origin to a 
presentation at Bates College for the conference, “Property: Claims to Ownership and 
Responsibilities of Stewardship.” We are grateful to Steve Engel for including us in that event 
and to conference participants for helpful suggestions and feedback. A version of the Article 
was delivered as the 2016 Addison C. Harris Lecture at the Indiana University Maurer School 
of Law, and we are grateful to attendees of that lecture for stimulating conversation and com-
ments. We have also benefitted from discussion with participants of faculty workshops at Yale 
Law School, the Legal Studies and Business Ethics Department of Wharton, and The Baldy 
Center for Law & Social Policy at SUNY Buffalo Law School. The authors dedicate this essay 
to David Larry Kysar—lover of wildness, skeptic of law, bidder for chaos, lost sadly and soon. 
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All men are, by nature, free and independent, and have certain inalienable rights, 
among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, pos-
sessing, and protecting property, and seeking and obtaining happiness and safety. 
Ohio Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 1 
Private property shall ever be held inviolate, but subservient to the public welfare. 
Ohio Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 19 
THE KINGDOM 
Terry Thompson had built a kingdom. His seventy-seven acres of land held a 
shanty village of crates, cages, gates, lean-tos, and shelters that housed fifty-six non-
human animals. Of those animals, two bears lived in an empty pool basin. A Siberian 
tiger roamed the nearby lawn. Inside the brick farmhouse that Thompson shared with 
his wife, Marian, three macaques groomed themselves in a dirt-floor den. Surround-
ing the macaques were motorcycle parts, vintage guitars, and a collection of 133 
firearms, including an unregistered semi-automatic rifle and eight other guns that 
violated federal registration or ownership laws. Wedged in Zanesville, Ohio between 
Kopchak Road and a stretch of Interstate 70, the Thompsons’ kingdom held a wealth 
of subjects that seemed inimitable. 
Their kingdom was equally precarious. In 2008, federal agents from the Bureau 
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) breached the gate of the prop-
erty and affixed a red laser sight on Terry’s chest. Rushing to the back of the house, 
the agents found Marian, unclothed as she changed between feeding different animal 
species so their scents would not carry. The week prior, Thompson had threatened a 
United States Department of Agriculture inspector. Bragging about his gun collec-
tion, Terry promised that he would shoot anyone who stepped foot on his land. 
Thompson did not fulfill that promise; instead, he was overwhelmed by the raid. 
Three years later, he was convicted and sentenced to twelve months of incarceration 
on federal firearms charges. Eighteen days after his confinement ended, Thompson 
released his animals from their prisons, cut bolts and destroyed fencing on many of 
his animals’ cages—ensuring that the animals could not easily be recaptured after 
their release—and then fired a bullet through his throat. 
The chaos that followed was well-documented, and heartbreaking. With the con-
currence of Jack Hanna—celebrity zookeeper and director emeritus of the Columbus 
Zoo—deputies from the Muskingum County Sheriff’s Office hunted down the ani-
mals one by one overnight and into the early morning. They worked to stem any 
harm the animals might otherwise cause to the residents of Zanesville or to motorists 
on nearby Interstate 70.  
As the macabre hunt progressed, the story leaked out in scattered dispatches: the 
911 recording of an improbably calm, elderly neighbor relating that she “live[s] next 
to Terry Thompson and there’s a bear and a lion out”;1 a highway warning sign wor-
thy of magical realist fiction; photographs of the limp carcasses of lions, bears, 
wolves, and other once fearsome creatures neatly arrayed for accounting outside a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Chris Jones, Animals: The Horrific True Story of the Zanesville Zoo Massacre, 
ESQUIRE (Feb. 6, 2012), http://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a12653/zanesville-0312/ 
[https://perma.cc/W63P-KKME]. 
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barn on the Thompson property. These surreal reporters’ notes from the heartland 
circled the globe, bringing unwanted attention to this mid-Ohio town of slightly more 
than 25,000. Back in Zanesville, after seventeen hours of response and rescue work, 
the cadavers of eighteen domesticated “Buckeye” Siberian tiger hybrids lay on the 
rain-soaked Thompsons’ property. Along with dozens of other slaughtered cadavers, 
the tigers proved a display of embarrassment to the excesses of the Muskingum 
County Animal Farm. 
In its unraveling, this saga speaks loudly about property, community, order, loss, 
and love. Far from exotic, the story highlights conceptual matters foundational to law 
and living, that motivate decisions and actions with profound consequences, yet that 
often escape our mental grasp. Such matters include the presumed distinction be-
tween a category of living beings considered legal “persons” and a category of own-
able “things”; the aim of the liberal political tradition to somehow promote, with 
equal verve, both liberty of action and security from harm; the paradigms of “own-
ership” and “stewardship” that compete for dominance within property law theory 
and that purport to characterize, in distinct ways, the rights and obligations of prop-
erty holders; the juxtaposition of democratic self-regulation and technocratic mana-
gerial control as alternate rather than interdependent modes of governance; our hu-
man love of “wild” animals and desire for closeness with them, even as we fear their 
lethality and try to contain it within cages; and, ultimately, the grand dialectic of 
control and chaos that laid tracks that October night in Ohio.  
Although studied here through a singular Midwestern tragedy and a seemingly 
idiosyncratic area of law—exotic animal ownership regimes—these conceptual ten-
sions are, we believe, emblematic of fundamental conversations about the place of 
property in society. Lacking satisfactory intellectual coherence, they nonetheless 
persist and reach toward a greater understanding of the nature of community and 
why—in Thompson’s case—the community ruptured and failed. Here we examine 
that rupturing primarily through an exegesis of the story, rather than through a more 
conventional law review article structure. Legal and theoretical analysis is inter-
spersed throughout, including sections that address the common law of exotic animal 
ownership, cultural and cognitive divisions between humans and nonhuman animals, 
stewardship as a complementary approach to property ownership, Ohio’s statutory 
and regulatory response to the events in Zanesville, and a subsequent court battle 
over the constitutionality of that response. However, our central focus remains on the 
story throughout, in hopes that we might learn simply by paying close attention to its 
tangled, tragic, and seemingly inexplicable details.  
In adopting this approach, we nod appreciatively to theorists who posit that reality 
in the law is “not merely recounted by narrative but constituted by it.”2 At core, we 
seek to use tensions in Thompson’s story to problematize infrequently examined, but 
foundational, assumptions about stewardship, love, property, and selfhood. In par-
ticular, two lines of tension—between ownable things versus subjective beings, and 
between liberty of action versus security from harm—play large in this narrative. 
These lines appear in the distinctive presence of nonhuman animals in the story and 
in the state of Ohio’s statutory efforts to prevent future tragedies from exotic animal 
                                                                                                                 
 
 2. ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 111 (2000) 
(emphasis in original).  
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ownership. Before examining these features of the story, we take a step back to con-
sider nonhuman animals’ conventional treatment under the law, beginning with the 
law of property in domestication pursuant to which Terry Thompson built his collec-
tion of things. 
CULTIVATING THE GARDEN 
At common law, wild animals are neither possessed nor self-possessed.3 Deer, 
foxes, and canaries serve as famous examples.4 Feed a fox daily with scraps from 
your cutting board: the shrewd attendee will not be yours. It is not until he is caught 
or killed that the fox will become the beholder’s property.5 Even after being caught, 
wild animals who escape or are released may cease to be the property of previous 
owners. Absolute legal ensnarement typically must occur through taming or domes-
tication.6 Until that point, loose, wild animals in most jurisdictions are objects of the 
state, and capturing and killing them requires a permit and a license.7 In this way, 
each state in the United States enjoys some of the privileges of sovereignty that the 
King of England had in owning the forest and its wildlife.8  
Notwithstanding those background principles, most exotic animals owned by in-
dividuals fall into a separate category of property: They are not wild. They have been 
bred in domestic settings or are otherwise domesticated, even if they remain more 
dangerous and unfamiliar than the average house pet.9 On the Thompsons’ farm, for 
example, the tigers mistakenly portrayed by news reports as wild and endangered 
Bengal tigers were actually a domesticated cross of Siberian and Bengal tigers that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 3. See GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 41 (1995). 
 4. See, e.g., Manning v. Mitcherson, 69 Ga. 447 (1883) (an escaped and ensnared canary 
was property of the original owner, as the canary had been domesticated); Buster v. Newkirk, 
20 Johns. 75 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822) (deer was unowned until killed); Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). 
 5. Pierson, 3 Cai. at 179 (mortal wounding and continuous pursuit, ensnaring, or actual 
possession of the fox was required for ownership). 
 6. See IRUS BRAVERMAN, ZOOLAND: THE INSTITUTION OF CAPTIVITY 138 (2013) 
(“[C]ourts have established that ‘wild animals reduced from the wild state in compliance with 
applicable law become property of an individual.’”). 
 7. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Smith, 986 S.W.2d 54, 60 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (“[F]erae 
naturae is a common law doctrine tracing its origins back to the Roman empire whereby wild 
animals are presumed to be owned by no one specifically but by the people generally. Specifi-
cally, ferae naturae provides that wild animals belong to the state . . . .” (footnotes omitted) 
(citation omitted)); see also Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896). 
 8. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *412–16. Echoes of royal privilege also 
appear in the ownership of exotic animals by individuals, who perhaps seek to symbolize their 
“sovereign” power over backyard domains much as royal menageries once did for entire king-
doms and empires. See BRAVERMAN, supra note 6, at 26. 
 9. The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 22(b) (AM. LAW. INST. 2010) defines a wild animal, for which an owner may be held 
strictly liable for harm caused, as “an animal that belongs to a category of animals that have 
not been generally domesticated and that are likely, unless restrained, to cause personal 
injury.” 
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had been bred in Ohio for several generations.10 Most statutes considering exotic 
animals refer to them as just that: exotics, not as “formerly-wild” or “often-found-in-
the-wild.” The law passed in Ohio after Terry Thompson killed himself refers, alter-
nately and somewhat confusingly, to “dangerous wild animals,”11 a category that in-
cludes twenty listed species whose wildness seems inherent to their name—such as 
bears, wildcats, and wolves—but whose bodies are subject to ownership and control. 
Domestication aside, the construction of the statute and the moniker “dangerous” 
reflect a public safety motive for regulating exotic animal ownership.12 This motive 
is apparent in the narrative preceding the statute’s passage as well: Ohio’s Dangerous 
Wild Animals Act was a direct response to Thompson’s death. However, its roots 
run to another tragedy: the law mimics an executive order13 that was promulgated 
after the mauling of twenty-four-year-old, Ohio-native Brent Kandra by a captive 
black bear in August 2010.14 Kandra was employed as the animal caretaker of an-
other notorious exotic animal owner, Sam Mazzolla, who lived southwest of 
Cleveland, across the street from a new high-end suburban development. Mazolla’s 
collection rivaled Terry Thompson’s: eight bears, twelve wolves, a lion, four tigers, 
and likely coyotes, dogs, and skunks as well. Mazzola had filed for bankruptcy sev-
eral months before the mauling death—financial insolvency apparently stalks exotic-
animal owners, whose ability to acquire exotic animals outpaces their ability to keep 
them. Mazzola had previously lost his license to exhibit animals and pled guilty to 
the illegal sale and attempted sale of skunks and to the transport of a black bear to 
Toledo without a license.  
Kandra’s death disturbed Ohioans and awoke the governor’s office to the state’s 
regulatory void. Before its demise, Sam Mazzola’s operation menaced his neighbors 
as they lay in bed on Ohio’s late summer nights. In Zanesville, unsettling noises 
likewise escaped from the cages lining the driveway at Kopchak Road. Given the 
physical omens vibrating in these towns—and the presence of other attacks prior to 
201015—the lack of regulation in Ohio prior to Thompson’s death raises hackles. At 
the time of Thompson’s suicide, Ohio had among the least-developed exotic animal 
                                                                                                                 
 
 10. CHARLES SIEBERT, ROUGH BEASTS: THE ZANESVILLE ZOO MASSACRE, ONE YEAR 
LATER loc. 325–26 (2012) (ebook). 
 11. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 935.04 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 12. To be “owned” by a private person in the conventional sense, the exotic animal must 
be tamed, yet the possibility remains that the animal will be incompletely broken. 
 13. Ohio Exec. Order No. 2010-17S (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.gongwer-oh.com/129 
/execorder10-17s.pdf [https://perma.cc/439R-A9LK]. 
 14. Unless otherwise specified, for information pertaining to Sam Mazzola’s exotic ani-
mal operation, see Thomas J. Sheeran, Caretaker Dies Following Bear Attack at Ohio 
Exotic Animal Farm with Troubled History, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2010, 7:58 PM), 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/unleashed/2010/08/caretaker-dies-following-bear-attack-at 
-ohio-exotic-animal-farm-with-troubled-history.html [https://perma.cc/6HCZ-GXGX]. 
 15. See Carolyn Pesce, Dennis Cauchon & Oren Dorell, Scary Safari in Ohio Ends with 
Carnage, Questions, USA TODAY, (Oct. 19, 2011, 10:20 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com 
/news/nation/story/2011-10-18/exotic-animals-loose-ohio/50821092/1 [https://perma.cc 
/98XK-HW6R] (“Ohio has some of the nation’s weakest restrictions on exotic pets and among 
the highest number of injuries and deaths caused by them. The Humane Society of the United 
States has documented 22 incidents with dangerous exotic animals in Ohio since 2003, demon-
strating risks to public health and safety and animal welfare.”). 
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ownership laws in the United States. Indeed, essentially no restrictions applied to a 
noncommercial owner such as Terry Thompson.16 The severity of the regulatory void 
is underscored by a little-noted infraction issued in connection with the Muskingum 
County Animal Farm massacre. Late on the evening of Terry Thompson’s death, as 
word of the events spread, five young residents from a nearby town drove to the 
Thompson farm and surreptitiously loaded one of the fallen tigers into the back of 
their Jeep Cherokee. After they were caught and the tiger carcass returned—whose 
absence otherwise would have thrown off the sheriff department’s count and perpet-
uated the Zanesville chaos—the youth were charged with misdemeanor theft of prop-
erty.17 Apparently, in this Buckeye rendering of the Night-watchman State, no other 
legal or regulatory stricture described their actions. To the observing global public, 
a senseless slaughter of animal life had followed an inexplicable breakdown of per-
sonal and communal order. To the extant legal system, five private parties stole chat-
tel from another—never mind that both the chattel and its owner were dead. 
A LEXICAL DIVISION 
The disjoint between popular reactions and legal treatment belies more fundamen-
tal divisions. While the legal and statutory treatment of exotic animals adheres to 
norms of possession and public safety, the international attention to the Zanesville 
massacre was motivated by an outpouring of grief and concern over loss of the 
Thompsons’ animals—a motive premised on what we might call the unspeakable 
kinship that humans hold with nonhuman animals. This kinship is “unspeakable” 
because our very language tends to prefigure a distinction categorical in nature be-
tween human and nonhuman animals. To even describe the relation is to do violence 
to it. Ironically, the English “human” draws from Genesitic notions of flesh coming 
from clay, inanimate earth, and more directly, medieval dichotomies of earth and 
heaven, whereas the word “animal” draws from notions of air, inhalation, or even of 
souls.18 Absent this elemental, and seemingly reversed, lexical schism—between hu-
man and animal, earth and air—is it possible to imagine a more fully realized com-
munion among animals, a communion of the kind apparently sought by Terry and 
Marian Thompson?19 
                                                                                                                 
 
 16. Speaking of his animals to a local news reporter, Thompson said, “I have them be-
cause I love them and am willing to do whatever I have to take care of them. . . . What I don’t 
have them for is profit . . . .” Nicole Weisensee Egan & Jeff Truesdell, Exotic Animal Owner 
Terry Thompson: What Happened?, PEOPLE (Oct. 22, 2011, 4:20 PM), http://people.com 
/celebrity/terry-thompson-ohio-zoo-owner-the-inside-story/ [https://perma.cc/Z9LS-2YUR]. 
Ohio drew a distinction between accredited commercial and noncommercial owners of exotic 
animals, exempting the former from the dangerous wild animal law. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
935.03 (LexisNexis 2013 & Supp. 2016). 
 17. Jones, supra note 1. 
 18. See Human, ERNEST KLEIN, A COMPREHENSIVE ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1966); Animal, ERNEST WEEKLEY’S AN ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF 
MODERN ENGLISH (1921). 
 19. Perhaps this communion was the one glimpsed by Derrida in a brief passage involving 
his cat and his own surprise at having experienced embarrassment when he was seen naked by 
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This aspiration to kinship emerges in the popular conversation concerning the 
Zanesville disaster as well. During and after the event, regard and respect for non-
human animals became an unmistakable theme. Many reporters asked why the ani-
mals were not tranquilized and recaptured, a humane alternative that officials like 
Hanna had deemed too risky under the circumstances.20 Television journalist Diane 
Sawyer later led Hanna to admit the event would haunt him “for the rest of [his] 
life,”21 even as he held firm to the view that no other route of response was viable 
during the crisis. For months afterwards, animal lovers around the world reportedly 
called the Zanesville 911 hotline to curse and berate the dispatch operator for her 
perceived role in the massacre.22 Closer to the scene, Marian Thompson revealed her 
filial connection to the animals by pleading, “Please don’t take my babies.”23 Hanna 
reportedly secured her consent to the removal of the few remaining live animals only 
by promising, “I’ll take care of your children.”24  
Marian’s words were reflective of her and Terry’s possessive and well-
documented love for their animals,25 a love that was echoed in the broad and fierce 
response to the hunting death of Cecil the lion by a Minnesota dentist in 201526 and 
to the intentional killing of Harambe, a male gorilla at the Cincinnati Zoo, after a 
                                                                                                                 
 
his cat following a shower. That sensation of self-consciousness before the gaze of a cat sug-
gests a kind of mutuality or kinship that may have existed “before the names,” or “outside of 
the names.” After all, why should I be embarrassed before you, a mere thing? See Jacques 
Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am (More To Follow), 28 CRITICAL INQUIRY 369, 373 
(David Wills trans. 2002); see also id. at 392 (“The animal is a word, it is an appellation that 
men have instituted, a name they have given themselves the right and the authority to give to 
another living creature . . . .”). 
 20. Alexander Chancellor, The Killing of Exotic Animals in Ohio Unleashed Wild 
Sentimentality, GUARDIAN (Oct. 20, 2011 3:00 PM), http://www.theguardian.com 
/commentisfree/2011/oct/20/exotic-animals-ohio-wild-sentimentality [https://perma.cc 
/6CYD-NDS9]; see also Jones, supra note 1 (describing the difficulty of safely tranquilizing 
large animals, especially under rainy nighttime conditions). 
 21. World News Tonight with Diane Sawyer (ABC television broadcast Oct. 20, 2011), 
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2011/10/jack-hanna-on-zanesville-ohio-animals-we 
-would-have-had-carnage/ [https://perma.cc/RDG5-JWM6]. 
 22. When someone finally called with an actual emergency, the operator broke down in 
relief. Jones, supra note 1.  
 23. Chancellor, supra note 20. 
 24. Egan & Truesdell, supra note 16. Hanna and the Columbus Zoo did not fulfill this 
promise: while in the custody of the Zoo, one of the Thompsons’ animals—a panther named 
Anton—“was euthanized [sic] after a steel door slammed on his neck while he was being 
transported from one cage to another.” Kathy Thompson, Ohio Exotic Animal Owner Speaks 
Out 1st Time Since Ordeal, USA TODAY (Jan. 23, 2013, 4:09 PM), http://www.usatoday.com 
/story/news/nation/2012/10/18/ohio-exotic-animals/1640871/ [https://perma.cc/2AY7-MSWD] 
(Kathy Thompson is a Zanesville reporter of no relation to Terry Thompson). 
 25. Reflecting on his visit to the Thompsons’ farm a year before Terry’s suicide, Dr. 
Robert Masone stated, “If I could describe what I felt that day on that farm with one word it 
was love.” Egan & Truesdell, supra note 16. 
 26. See Christina Capecchi & Katie Rogers, Killer of Cecil the Lion Finds Out That He 
Is a Target Now, of Internet Vigilantism, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com 
/2015/07/30/us/cecil-the-lion-walter-palmer.html [https://perma.cc/UKZ2-8RME]. 
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young boy wandered into the gorilla’s enclosure.27 Although most U.S. citizens live 
a great distance from the physical needs and majesty of exotic or wild animals, our 
culture rings with a pronounced concern for their well-being. That popular concern 
does not transfer to all species, as animal rights proponents lament.28 Nonetheless, a 
broad scholarly literature has developed applying notions of animal “rights” to the 
numerous agricultural, laboratory, and companion animals that populate our nation 
alongside human animals.29 Acknowledging such rights—for example, the right to a 
safe living environment free from abuse—implicitly treats nonhuman animals as sub-
jects that may hold interests of their own accord in our legal system. Whether chim-
panzees have legal standing to invoke the writ of habeas corpus, for example, has 
been discussed in at least one recent court order in a case brought by The Nonhuman 
Rights Project.30 In addition to its symbolic value, such standing could provide a 
form of practical vindication for those outraged at cruelty or neglect of animals. 
However, most proponents of animal rights hold grander aims than passage of 
anti-cruelty statutes and recognition of legal standing. What they ultimately seek is 
to problematize the dividing line that separates “persons” from mere “things” at the 
basic level of language, cognition, and culture. That line does unnoticed yet founda-
tional work in identifying the individuals who are eligible to join the political com-
munity with all its attendant rights of membership, including the right to own non-
eligible individuals.31 When Marian Thompson lamented the loss of “49 beings that 
were the heart and soul of [her] existence,”32 she hinted at a vision in which all life 
is considered sovereign, coequal, and capable of communion with other life.33 Such 
a vision is, of course, fanciful, as the Thompsons’ own backyard rendering attests. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 27. Mike McPhate, Zoo’s Killing of a Gorilla Holding a Boy Prompts Outrage, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 30, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/31/us/zoos-killing-of-gorilla 
-holding-a-boy-prompts-outrage.html [https://perma.cc/2FYS-JARN].  
 28. See, e.g., Eric de Place, Charismatic Animals Get All the Love, GRIST (May 12, 2005), 
http://grist.org/article/the-case-for-charisma/ [https://perma.cc/TF5T-NW5X]. 
 29. See generally ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ANIMAL RIGHTS AND ANIMAL WELFARE (Marc 
Bekoff ed., 2d ed. 2010). 
 30. Decision and Order, The Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Stanley, No. 152736/15 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 29, 2015). For historical precedent, proponents of animals’ legal standing 
often cite the fact that animals were periodically treated as legal subjects in medieval court 
proceedings. See generally Anila Srivastava, “Mean, Dangerous, and Uncontrollable 
Beasts”: Mediaeval Animal Trials, MOSAIC, March 2007, at 127. The social meaning and 
significance of this legal practice is hotly contested among historians, with many viewing 
animals’ legal standing in ecclesiastical courts as signifying a felt need to reinforce a biblically 
ordained hierarchy of being rather than actual beliefs regarding animal moral agency. See, e.g., 
E.P. Evans, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT OF ANIMALS 40 (1906). 
 31. See Steven M. Wise, The Legal Thinghood of Nonhuman Animals, 23 BOS. C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 471 (1996). 
 32. Thompson, supra note 24. 
 33. Cf. Elan Abrell, Lively Sanctuaries: A Shabbat of Animal Sacer, in ANIMALS, 
BIOPOLITICS, LAW 134, 149 (Irus Braverman ed., 2016) (“Human and nonhuman animals in 
sanctuaries form . . . multispecies assemblages through which they share intersubjective 
experiences with each other, generating their own atmospheres of animal legality in which 
oppositions between human/animal, freedom/captivity, care/control, and subject/property are 
both challenged and reconfigured.”). 
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But we must also question the conventional vision of a stable hierarchy of being, 
especially one that has historically viewed political membership as tightly bound up 
with the ability to own things and that has often been constructed in ways grotesque.34 
Neither vision reflects a natural order; instead each is a product of human ethical 
imagination or lack of imagination. 
Respecting that nuance, this Article does not specifically interrogate questions of 
standing for animals or the traditional legislative aims of animal rights proponents. 
Instead we examine a broader, more conflicted social element of property ownership 
which is present regardless of animals’ legal standing: the concept of “stewardship.” 
As will become clear in the following sections, the form and topic of stewardship, 
while helpful in its aim to encompass potentially conflicting interests in possession, 
ultimately offers no easy answers for the case of Terry Thompson. 
FOR I ALSO AM A STEWARD 
Like guardianship, trusteeship, or pastoral care,35 “stewardship” provides an 
ethical and historical counterpoint to notions of property focused narrowly on 
individuals’ selfish interests in ownership.36 The core idea captured by the steward-
ship concept is the notion that individual property owners have certain obligations to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 34. Problematically, to underscore the line’s significance, animal rights activists some-
times cite historical periods in which whole classes of humans were similarly disempowered 
or even subject to ownership and enslavement. See PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 
(HarperCollins rev. ed. 2009) (1975). The analogy is controversial in part because it seems 
capable of working in two directions: validating either the dignity of animals or the indignity 
of humans. See Anne Peters, Liberté, Égalité, Animalité: Human-Animal Comparisons in Law, 
5 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 25, 35–36 (2016). 
The city of Zanesville has something of a history of challenging supposed ontological giv-
ens and of reaching toward a more just and inclusive community. Officially nicknamed the 
“City of Natural Advantages,” Zanesville was also once prominently referred to as the “City 
of Lost Boundaries.” City of Lost Boundaries, JET, Nov. 22, 1951, at 10. An article in Jet 
magazine in 1951 explained: “A racial melting pot for more than a century, Zanesville, Ohio, 
is a city of lost boundaries. Entire families have been crossing and recrossing the color line for 
so many generations that today it is virtually impossible to tell which families are white and 
which are colored without visiting city cemeteries, which are still segregated.” Id. at 10. After 
observing that economic circumstances for some 7000 identified black Zanesville residents in 
1951 remain bleak, the article closed on an optimistic note, predicting that Zanesville might 
become “America’s most-thoroughly integrated city,” and quoting a resident as saying, “That 
old discrimination is breaking down. Things are looking up as never before.” Id. at 12. 
As of 2013, the city’s percentage of African-American residents had dropped below ten 
percent, down from almost twenty percent in 1951, with a large percentage of those residents 
living in poverty. See id.; Zanesville, Ohio, DATA USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo 
/zanesville-oh/#demographics [https://perma.cc/EHW6-VJZP] (reproducing American 
Community Survey five-year estimates to show the number of black or African American 
individuals both living in Zanesville (1862) and living in Zanesville and in poverty (622), 
respectively). 
 35. See BRAVERMAN, supra note 6, at 21–22 (applying Foucault’s concept of pastoral 
power to the context of zoos, where meticulous and even zealous management of an animal’s 
environment reflects a shepherd-like control by authorities). 
 36. See, e.g., James P. Karp, A Private Property Duty of Stewardship: Changing Our 
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the community that govern the use and care of their property.37 As an affirmative 
obligation to consider and fulfill the interests of others in this manner, stewardship 
transcends the bedrock harm principle of liberalism.38  
While stewardship is often discussed in the context of resource management—be 
they financial or natural resources39—it is less prominent in debates over animal 
ownership. To be sure, notions of stewardship have been applied to the goals and 
methods of the Endangered Species Act, but the purpose of that act is to conserve 
species as collective entities rather than to protect any individual lives comprising a 
species.40 Here we seek to characterize stewardship for the specific context of indi-
vidual animal ownership, where the owners’ communal obligations extend not only 
                                                                                                                 
 
Land Ethic, 23 ENVTL. L. 735 (1993). For a classic statement of the self-interested view, see 2 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2: 
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the 
affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and despotic dominion 
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total 
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe. 
For important qualifications, see A. M. Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN 
JURISPRUDENCE 107, 113 (A. G. Guest ed., 1961) (“[I]t would be a distortion—and one of 
which the eighteenth century, with its overemphasis on subjective rights, was patently guilty 
—to speak as if this concentration of patiently garnered rights was the only legally or socially 
important characteristic of the owner’s position. The present analysis, by emphasizing that the 
owner is subject to characteristic prohibitions and limitations, and that ownership comprises 
at least one important incident independent of the owner’s choice, is an attempt to redress the 
balance.”); Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 
601 (1998). 
 37. David B. Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property: A Call for Judicial 
Protection of the Public's Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 311, 319 (1988). 
 38. See JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY, UTILITARIANISM, AND OTHER 
ESSAYS 1, 13 (Mark Philp & Frederick Rosen eds., Oxford Univ. Press new ed. 2015) (1859) 
(asserting that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member 
of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others”). 
 39. See, e.g., 25 MICH. CIV. JURIS. Water § 36, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2016); 
55 N.Y. JUR. 2D Environmental Rights § 95, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2016) (allowing 
the state to enter into stewardship agreements with persons, which “must require that the beach 
or shoreline area be preserved and maintained in its natural state or managed to enhance or 
restore the natural values that it provides”); Tamara C. Belinfanti, Shareholder Cultivation 
and New Governance, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 789, 789 (2014) (describing a U.K. Investor 
Stewardship Code adopted to reduce investor short-termism); see also Bashar Nuseibeh & 
Steve Easterbrook, Requirements Engineering: A Roadmap, PROC. CONF. ON FUTURE 
SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 35 (2000) (explaining the stewardship-like “requirements engineer-
ing” framework, which posits that the views of people and organizations impacted by software 
development should be incorporated into the development process). 
 40. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012). For a fascinating back-and-forth on this distinction that de-
volves into an apparent proxy battle over human reproductive rights couched in terms of 
whether the impairment of breeding habitat causes “harm” to a living piping plover or only to 
its potential offspring, see the opinions of Justice O’Connor and Justice Scalia in Babbitt v. 
Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995). Note that 
popular opinion often cuts toward the primacy of individuals over species: we express outrage 
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to their human neighbors but also to the animals themselves. The animal context 
brings to the fore a feature of stewardship not always recalled; namely, its potential 
to highlight not only needs and concerns of the community, but also teleological in-
terests of the stewarded property itself. Aldo Leopold’s land ethic—a classic expres-
sion of stewardship in the context of natural resources management—emphasized 
this potential through his call for an “ecological conscience” that would guide human 
land governance according to a simple, if elusive, principle: “A thing is right when 
it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is 
wrong when it tends otherwise.”41 Such an ethic of teleological preservation and ful-
fillment may be even more challenging to follow in the case of animal ownership 
where interests must be inferred and potentially individuated.42 
We venture this tentative characterization of stewardship for the animal owner-
ship context alongside close conceptual cousins. It reflects but does not replicate a 
trustee relationship where property is held for a named beneficiary.43 It pertains to 
but transcends guardianship where paternalistic powers fall short of the right to dis-
pose of such property.44 And it approximates but differs from pastoral care where the 
state exercises power over entities that are unequivocally regarded as subjects.45 
When taken as this form, stewardship raises several practical questions: who is the 
steward, what is the thing being stewarded, for what interests is the thing being stew-
arded, what actions constitute stewardship, and how might the steward or an external 
party judge the adequacy of those actions? In the narrative we recount here the fifty-
six exotic animals are the things being stewarded; Terry, Marian, and their animal 
caretaker, John Moore, are stewarding, with the latter substantially serving as an 
agent; the interests include the animals’ continued, healthy, and even self-realized 
existence as well as interests of the surrounding community; and the actions are nu-
merous and linked, extending to other actors beyond the immediate stewards. Taking 
the sum of these answers, Terry Thompson’s stewardship is judged deficient due to 
                                                                                                                 
 
at the death of individual animals as subjects more than we do at the diminution of species 
over time, whose decline and disappearance we scarcely register. 
 41. ALDO LEOPOLD, The Land Ethic, in A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE 
AND THERE 201, 224–25 (1949). 
 42. Consider, analogously, the individuation required for pastoral care. See BRAVERMAN, 
supra note 6, at 22 (“The shepherd counts the sheep; he counts them in the evening to see that 
they are all there, and he looks after each of them individually. He does everything for the 
totality of his flock, but he does everything also for each sheep of the flock.” (quoting MICHEL 
FOUCAULT, 8 February 1978, in SECURITY, TERRITORY, POPULATION: LECTURES AT THE 
COLLÈGE DE FRANCE, 1977–1978, at 115, 128 (Michel Senellart ed., Graham Burchell trans., 
2007))). Braverman’s characterization of pastoral power offers the most striking similarities 
to the construction of stewardship we discuss fleetingly here. Our characterizations of pastoral 
care and stewardship diverges from Braverman and Foucault in our effort to view stewardship 
as an act of self-interested, property-owning individuals who may also serve analogously to 
(or as agents of) states in their pastoral care-like functions. 
 43. Here the beneficiary may be the property itself, that is, the nonhuman animals. 
 44. In the Thompsons’ case, they earned income through the labor of their animals. In the 
adopt-a-beach stewardship program, 55 N.Y. JUR. 2D Environmental Rights § 95, natural re-
sources are disposed of for others’ benefit. 
 45. In their treatment, the animals on the Thompsons’ property occupy a mixed status as 
both subjects and personal property. 
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the animals’ violent and premature deaths, along with the distress and trauma spread 
widely by their release. 
Despite its cataclysmic finale, however, the Thompsons’ farm was not devoid of 
a semblance of stewardship. Terry, Marian, and their caretaker, John Moore, care-
fully orchestrated animal feedings.46 They scavenged for road kill and bought bulk 
meat waste from grocers. With considerable patience and effort, they treated all items 
before feeding them to the animals. Hundreds of pounds per day passed through their 
hands. They did so to nourish and satisfy their flock, and in a way that shielded the 
animals from acquiring a taste for fresh meat. Such an effort necessarily entailed an 
aspect of service and stewardship, and it was done for, if not a community good, at 
least a benefit that surpassed the Thompsons’ private sphere. Their collection pro-
vided some excitement to the town and some recognition as well: The exotics had 
been displayed on local TV shows and had achieved national exposure through ap-
pearances on Leno, Letterman, and Rachael Ray, and at events such as Bloomberg’s 
corporate parties.47 Closer to home, the Thompsons often showed their smaller ani-
mals at schools, 4-H meetings, and other children’s events.48 Of course, not all of the 
excitement was welcome in town. Police had been called repeatedly to Kopchak 
Road on reports of stray animals.49 Most often horses had escaped, but a mountain 
lion and grizzly bear had also left the grounds, only to be led back by the weighty 
hand of Terry Thompson.50 
This ambivalent approach of Thompson’s—at times stewarding and at times ne-
glecting responsibility, that is, when stewardship meant keeping the animals on-
site51—mirrors a broader societal ambivalence towards the dominion or stewardship 
of animals.52 Rooted in the book of Genesis, that ambivalence has pervaded Western 
understanding of creation and its biblical purpose. The ambivalence is understanda-
ble, given the text’s dual charge. The first two chapters of Genesis include impera-
tives of varying force to alternately (1) cultivate and (2) subdue—or have dominion 
over—the “fish of the sea and over the birds of the sky and over every living thing 
that moves on the earth.”53 A second quote—from the second creation story in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 46. Unless otherwise specified, for the information pertaining to animal feedings at the 
Thompsons’ and presentations, see SIEBERT, supra note 10, at loc. 342–46. 
 47. Id. at loc. 350–55. 
 48. Id. at loc. 47–51. 
 49. Id. at loc. 40–41. 
 50. Id. at loc. 41–45. 
 51. An argument can be made that a “self-realized” exotic animal will occasionally escape 
from its enclosure just as an occasional “self-realized” toddler might escape into a gorilla 
enclosure, although the authors express concern for these instances. Cf. McPhate, supra note 
27 (describing popular outrage at the killing of Harambe the gorilla after a child fell into its 
enclosure). Thompson may have believed as much in planning his animals’ release. On the 
subject of animal resistance to enclosure and mistreatment, see Kathryn Gillespie, Nonhuman 
Animal Resistance and the Improprieties of Live Property, in ANIMALS, BIOPOLITICS, LAW, 
supra note 33, at 117. 
 52. See JOHN GRIM & MARY EVELYN TUCKER, ECOLOGY AND RELIGION 37–40 (2014); 
Lynn White Jr., The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis, 155 SCIENCE 1203 (1967) 
(examining medieval views of dominance and “[a]n [a]lternative Christian [v]iew” that cele-
brates harmony with nature, with St. Francis of Assisi as a model of that view). 
 53. Genesis 1:28 (New American Standard Bible) (footnotes omitted). 
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Genesis—even hints that cultivation is not only humankind’s responsibility, but the 
very purpose for which humans were created: “Then the LORD God took the man 
and put him into the garden of Eden to cultivate it and keep it.”54 
Stewards should not be surprised by this Janus-faced aspect of the property rela-
tion. Any cultivation requires a modicum of control of the thing to be cultivated. Eve 
and Adam would fail their garden-tending duties if they were not licensed to prune 
diseased trees or set fire to overgrown thickets. They would need to exert control, 
much as we do now, to fine-tune plant genetics and, much as earlier civilizations did, 
to radically alter their landscapes.55 As it happened, Eve and Adam could not exert 
control over themselves.56 Likewise, Thompson failed his stewardship duties when 
he chose to abandon control of himself, most explicitly by suicide.57 
AN ARM OF THE STATE 
Thompson’s unhinged qualities played out in smaller, discrete episodes before the 
final tragedy. These events prefaced his ultimate undoing—revealing fundamental 
flaws in his character and triggering a state response that played out in antagonistic 
                                                                                                                 
 
 54. Genesis 2:15 (New American Standard Bible). This mission has been interpreted as 
one of husbandry, see Steve Bishop, Green Theology and Deep Ecology: New Age or New 
Creation?, THEMELIOS, April/May 1991, at 8, 9, a complementary regime of action and owner-
ship to our discussion of stewardship. As discussed in Hellenic writings, husbandry is 
anthropocentric and instrumental, positing the creation of fruit as the appropriate end of a 
practice of husbandry. Granted, the fruits of husbandry need not be tangible. See 3 PHILO, On 
Husbandry, in PHILO IN TEN VOLUMES 104, 113 (F.H. Colson & G.H. Whitaker trans., 1930) 
(“[I]t makes it its aim to sow or plant nothing that has no produce, but all that is fitted for 
cultivation and fruit-bearing, and likely to yield yearly tributes to man, its prince; . . . [T]here 
must also be soul nourishment, . . . wisdom and temperance and all virtue. For these when 
sown and planted in the mind will produce most beneficial fruits, namely fair and praiseworthy 
conduct.”). 
 55. The mixed-prairie woodland systems of Ohio’s pre-European landscape were the 
product of human manipulation by fire, clearing, cultivation, seed selection, and other manip-
ulations. See Kendra McLauchlan, Plant Cultivation and Forest Clearance by Prehistoric 
North Americans: Pollen Evidence from Fort Ancient, Ohio, USA. 13 HOLOCENE 557, 557 
(2003) (“[In 2000–1500 BCE,] North American Woodland societies were likely modifying 
vegetation more extensively through agriculture and other land-clearing activities than has 
been assumed previously.”); Doug MacCleery, Understanding the Role the Human Dimension 
Has Played in Shaping America’s Forest and Grassland Landscapes: Is There a Landscape 
Archeologist in the House?, ECO-WATCH (Feb. 10, 1994), http://forestpolicy 
.typepad.com/ecowatch/ew940210.htm [https://perma.cc/AQE8-7RL8]. 
 56. Self-control is regrettably gendered in this creation story and most renderings of it. In 
Thompson’s story, Marian seems to be the model for self-control in balance to Terry’s ex-
cesses, but such a dynamic also can be problematically gendered, if, for example, one holds 
Marian to such a standard of control but not Terry. See infra text accompanying note 169 
(raising additional questions regarding our limited understanding of Marian’s role in the 
Zanesville saga). 
 57. Thompson also would have failed if he was unable to control others, for example, by 
leading back the stray grizzly or mountain lion that had left his land and threatened to do 
mischief on the land of another less versed in their care and management. Cf. Fletcher v. 
Rylands (1865) 159 Eng. Rep. 737; 3 H. & C. 774. 
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and destructive ways. Thompson was a divisive and often feared member of his com-
munity. The instances of animal escape mentioned above were mere nuisances com-
pared to Thompson’s threats to those who dared cross him. Thompson’s eighty-two-
year-old neighbor, Fred Polk, found himself on the wrong side of those threats when 
Thompson’s beloved Rottweilers escaped and, on two separate occasions, attacked 
Polk’s calves.58 The first time it happened, Thompson atoned by promising Polk that 
he would keep the dogs in check. The second time, the Rottweilers killed two calves, 
and Polk shot the dogs dead before Thompson arrived. Collecting their bodies in the 
front seat of his pickup, Thompson drove off wordless, silent on his promise and the 
penalty for breach that Polk had exacted.  
In the months and years afterward, whenever Polk invited friends to hunt on his 
property, Thompson would pace the adjacent border with a gun on his shoulder. 
Thompson’s reaction was tied to his love of animals and his hatred of hunting gen-
erally. It was a fierce love, one that could sever ties with his human animal counter-
parts. Another neighbor, Sam Kopchak, once declined Thompson’s offer to pet a bear 
cub that Thompson held to his chest.59 Following the refusal, Thompson reportedly 
snapped at Kopchak, “People don’t understand animals.”60 Reading these words, it 
is not hard to imagine that in Thompson’s lexical division, “people” are the dis-
favored subjects. 
Indeed, Thompson’s behaviors suggested a more violent break with his species. 
When inspectors appeared on his property, Thompson would allegedly growl: “I’ll 
be damned . . . I’ll let them animals go!”61 Terry reportedly threatened similar harm 
at his sentencing on gun charges.62 The words and actions of other authorities before 
the attack suggest a widespread awareness of Terry Thompson’s volatility and the 
real threat he posed to those around him. “We were just afraid that this was going to 
happen. It wasn’t a matter of if it was going to happen, it was a matter of when,” 
David Durst, the Muskingum County Humane Officer, declared.63 
For all the awareness of Terry’s threats and resulting effort to remove his animals, 
local authorities and state actors failed to avert disaster. Some, such as Ohio 
Governor John Kasich, greeted the tragedy with equanimity, reasoning that “[a]ll the 
statutes in the world don’t keep something like what happened from happening. . . . 
I mean, who would have ever dreamt the guy’s gonna commit suicide, open up the 
cages?”64 On this view, liberal legal orders seem required to endure occasional 
                                                                                                                 
 
 58. Unless otherwise specified, for the information pertaining to this encounter between 
Thompson and Fred Polk, see SIEBERT, supra note 10, at loc. 359–70. 
 59. Jones, supra note 1. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Wayne Drash, Ohio Animal Owner Supplied Cub for Heidi Klum, CNN, (Oct. 20, 
2011, 5:06 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/19/us/exotic-animal-owner/ [https://perma.cc 
/UTV3-NF4W]. 
 62. SIEBERT, supra note 10, at loc. 407–22. 
 63. Drash, supra note 61. 
 64. Andrew Welsh-Huggins & John Seewer, Zanesville, Ohio Animal Owner Reportedly 
Traded Guns for Tiger, Monkey, HUFFINGTON POST, (Oct. 21, 2011 8:17 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/21/zanesville-ohio-exotic-animals-escape-killed_n 
_1026064.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20151109162937/http://www.huffingtonpost 
.com/2011/10/21/zanesville-ohio-exotic-animals-escape-killed_n_1026064.html]. 
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spasms of violence simply as part of the price of freedom. But Kasich’s question was 
rhetorical and defensive. His administration was under fire for allowing former gov-
ernor Ted Strickland’s executive order on exotic animals—the one that was passed 
after Brent Kandra’s death—to expire.65 Kasich’s question also seemed ignorant of 
Terry Thompson’s specific alleged threats. 
More than ignored, Thompson felt antagonized and even abandoned by the state. 
He was a Vietnam War draftee who had served as a twenty-year-old private second-
class, whose duties included “Helicopter Deck Helper” and “General Clerk.” He de-
ployed for fifty weeks from January 1969 to January 1970, a time that, according to 
his closest friends and associates, fundamentally changed his demeanor and relation 
to the state.66 As a returned soldier, Thompson talked about survivor’s guilt, outrage 
at the draft, and concern in having killed as a helicopter gunner on rescue missions.67 
He chided police officers who pulled him over, expressing resentment of paternalistic 
safety laws. He threatened inspectors who sought to enter his property.68 Seemingly 
all arms of the state were suspect: constraining his liberty while functionally deaf to 
the grievances he bore as a former draftee at the hands of the same state. 
These grievances simmered through years of building tension between Thompson 
and the state that was enhanced by pervasive state monitoring and interference. 
Thompson was visited thirty-five times by the sheriff’s office prior to his death.69 
The ATF covertly tracked Thompson through an informant.70 Sheriff Lutz openly 
discussed his intent to remove Thompson’s animals.71 When considered on their 
own, these actions appear as prudent efforts to contain a volatile figure. When viewed 
together and in context—particularly through the lens of Lutz’s statements—they 
seem like a coordinated effort to deprive Thompson of his “children,” a campaign 
that helped drive Thompson to his end.’ 
In a classic regulatory scheme, inspections such as these provide a check against 
mismanagement. Other possible interventions include prosecutions, licensure, regis-
tration, permitting, record keeping, audits, and bankruptcy proceedings. The first five 
of these measures are employed in the Dangerous Wild Animal Act.72 Such formal 
means of interference in poor stewardship may divert potentially destructive person-
alities such as Terry’s from a perceived inevitable end. But an equally valid reading 
                                                                                                                 
 
 65. See id. 
 66. SIEBERT, supra note 10, at loc. 195–97. 
 67. “Well, where were you when I was in Vietnam in a foxhole, people shooting at me, if 
you’re trying to protect me?” Thompson chided when given a ticket for not wearing a seatbelt. 
See Chris Heath, 18 Tigers, 17 Lions, 8 Bears, 3 Cougars, 2 Wolves, 1 Baboon, 1 Macaque, 
and 1 Man Dead in Ohio, GQ (Feb. 6, 2012, 1:00 AM), http://www.gq.com/story/terry 
-thompson-ohio-zoo-massacre-chris-heath-gq-february-2012 [https://perma.cc/HYS5-WP7C]. 
 68. SIEBERT, supra note 10, at loc. 383. (“He said ‘I’ll shoot anybody that steps foot on 
this land. I’ll do this and that.’”). 
 69. See Jones, supra note 1. 
 70. See Liz Navratil, Zanesville Exotic-Animal Owner Terry Thompson Lived and Died 
on the Edge, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (May 14, 2012, 9:27 AM), http://www.post-gazette 
.com/local/region/2012/05/13/Zanesville-exotic-animal-owner-Terry-Thompson-lived-and-died 
-on-the-edge/stories/201205130226 [https://perma.cc/V37M-6FJV]. 
 71. See Jones, supra note 1. 
 72. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 935.04 (registration), 935.15 (record keeping), 935.05-07 
(permitting), 935.24 (prosecution) (LexisNexis 2013). 
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of Thompson’s story is that frequent contact with local and federal authorities itself 
fated his traumatic undoing. 
Thompson’s later years were ones in which the state’s tendrils extended repeat-
edly and deeply into his life. In addition to the ATF raid and the repeated visits of 
the Muskingum County Sheriff Office, there were the tax liens and a prison sen-
tence.73 A few years earlier, he had been convicted of animal cruelty charges that 
friends regarded as trumped up, and he endured a second failed attempt by authorities 
to prosecute him for animal mistreatment.74 Close acquaintances expressed the theme 
of a system exerting unsustainable pressure on Thompson: “He’d been pushed to the 
limit and he snapped,” said Dr. Robert Masone, an anesthesiologist and frequent so-
cial visitor to the Thompson farm.75 Terry “was [driven] to the point where he didn’t 
have any other way out,” said Max Perdue, a longtime friend.76 
To offer another way out, the state of Ohio may have, and did eventually, focus 
efforts on preventative rather than post hoc interventionist measures for exotic ani-
mal owners.77 The Dangerous Wild Animals Act requires surety bonds and liability 
insurance that raise the barriers to entry for owning exotic animals.78 These financial 
requirements seem designed to filter out those prone to threadbare management, as 
Thompson was. By focusing on the moment of acquisition, such a prohibition avoids 
the intervention trap that Terry and local authorities fell into—where enforcement of 
the law failed to subdue or neutralize the threat that Terry posed, but rather precipi-
tated it.  
Noting this dynamic, the state’s treatment of Thompson—more than two-dozen 
visits, a professed intention by the sheriff’s office to take his animals away, and cov-
ert surveillance by the FBI79—raise additional questions about the regulatory 
functions exercised over him, namely: Does the price of freedom also include 
abandonment of those, like Thompson, who take its promises too seriously or for 
whom self-realization seems to entail intolerable risks to others? Who was 
stewarding the person of Terry Thompson, as a subject displaced and then returned 
to his place of birth after military service, and why was that charge ostensibly 
unfulfilled? Where, between neglect and the authorities’ seeming antagonism of 
Terry, lies the intervention that might reach our troubled kin?80 
                                                                                                                 
 
 73. See infra text accompanying note 151. 
 74. Egan & Truesdell, supra note 16. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. (alteration in original). 
 77. In addition to the various raids and prosecutions that Thompson faced, officials also 
could have used public nuisance suits as an ex post effort to address problematic exotic animal 
situations. See, e.g., Summit Cty. Bd. of Health v. Pearson, 809 N.E.2d. 80, 81 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2004) (upholding determination that a privately owned “collection of exotic and domestic ani-
mals, including lions, tigers, leopards, bears, foxes, pigeons, dogs, and an alligator” posed a 
public nuisance due to excessive odor and unsanitary conditions). 
 78. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 935.05(D), 935.08(D). 
 79. See supra text accompanying note 70. 
 80. Members of the Zanesville City Planning Commission worried in a 1913 report that 
the city’s very culture was one of individual isolation and disinterest in communal well-being: 
It seems that each citizen has been content with his lot, and selfish in his personal 
well-being, either too busy or too strangely indifferent to care for or interest him-
self in the general welfare of the city and its people. It is not one man alone, or 
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STEWARDS OF THE WILD 
Outside Zanesville, the larger Ohio community of exotic animal traders held di-
vided views about the Thompsons. It was a surprisingly robust community owing to 
Ohio’s lax regulations prior to the Zanesville escape. However, several years before 
Terry shot himself, the nearby and nationally prominent Mt. Hope exotic animal auc-
tion ceased carrying animals deemed to be dangerous to public safety, citing bad 
publicity and scrutiny of such sales when the animals later escape into surrounding 
communities.81 In the wake of Thompson’s death, many auction buyers expressed 
resentment that Thompson’s actions would jeopardize their ownership of seemingly 
non-dangerous animals as well. Others expressed sympathy for Thompson and fear 
that their animals would be seized by federal authorities. Some went so far as to posit 
that Thompson’s suicide was staged as a rationale by unknown possessors of gov-
ernment authority to seize his animals. Regardless of concerns or intentions, the de-
cision by the Mt. Hope auction owner-managers, Thurman and Chester Mullet, to no 
longer host trades and sales of the largest wildcats, apes, bears, giraffes, elephants, 
and like animals reflected a slowly-evolving ethos about the propriety and drawbacks 
of such exchanges. 
Their actions represent what one might consider preemptive self-regulation on the 
part of animal traders.82 The traders made a decision that limited their business, albeit 
in a self-interested way. The minority of dangerous animals that they sold could lead 
to a public relations nightmare if one of the animals injured or killed a human neigh-
bor. Even a series of nonviolent animal escapes could turn the tide of public opinion 
against the auction, if the public became convinced that the animals were a threat to 
lives they considered sacrosanct. Such a fear is not without basis. Most individuals 
outside of the exotic animal community are likely unaware of its scope and impact: 
As many as 30,000 large privately-owned exotic animals live in the United States, 
including 10,000 to 15,000 big cats;83 as many as 246 maulings and 21 deaths from 
                                                                                                                 
 
any one set of men, who is thus afflicted, but it is a disease that seems to have 
become a general affliction. The spirit seems to be one of general apathy, with a 
motto: “Let the other fellow do it.” 
WILSON W. BUCHANAN, EDWARD R. MEYER & WILLIAM W. HARPER, REPORT OF THE CITY 
PLANNING COMMISSION TO THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE PUBLISHED FOR THE INFORMATION OF 
CITIZENS AND TAXPAYERS OF ZANESVILLE, OHIO 7 (1913), https://books.google.com/books?id 
=zDhAAQAAMAAJ&lpg=PA8&dq=zanesville%20city%20planning%20commission&pg=PA7 
#v=onepage&q&f=false [https://perma.cc/JHF3-3QXL]. 
 81. See SIEBERT, supra note 10, at loc. 267–71. Unless otherwise specified, for infor-
mation on the Mt. Hope Auction, see SIEBERT, supra note 10, at loc. 225–301. 
 82. For a more reactive example of self-regulation, see Charles F. Sabel & William H. 
Simon, Contextualizing Regimes: Institutionalization as a Response to the Limits of Interpre-
tation and Policy Engineering, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1265, 1279–80 (2012), in which the authors 
discuss the California Leafy Greens Products Handler Marketing Agreement as one example 
of a private-public collaboration. The agreement was designed specifically for self-regulation, 
albeit after harm had occurred to food-poisoned consumers and on regulatory ground that had 
been ceded by the FDA. Id. 
 83. Christopher M. Lucca, Note, Keeping Lions, Tigers, and Bears (Oh My!) in Check: 
The State of Exotic Pet Regulation in the Wake of the Zanesville, Ohio Massacre, 24 VILL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 125, 126 (2013). 
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captive large cats alone have occurred in the past eleven years.84 The policy change 
the Mullet brothers enacted at the Mt. Hope auction was a way of imposing self-
constraints in advance of, and hopefully instead of, a public outcry and a subsequent 
shift in law and regulation. 
As is now well appreciated, self-limitation and internal-norm imposition is perva-
sive in merchants’ guilds and similar networks, including those formed for the pur-
pose of hunting wild animals. In their heyday, hunters of whales, foxes, ducks, etc., 
typically claimed their property via rules that took the form of social norms or cus-
toms rather than formal legal fiat.85 Robert Ellickson’s analysis of whaling cultures 
powerfully evidences this local process as a natural, sociologically-driven means of 
property rule development rooted in community but respected by law.86  
Early property rules arguably developed collectively within these kinds of close-
knit groups, rather than from a monarch or congress.87 Those groups could identify 
deviants, chastise them, and thereby protect the narrow interests of the people who 
were hunting.88 Other property rules might consider slightly broader interests. For 
instance, fox hunting adjudications might nod to interests of farmers in protecting 
their hens.89 Fencing norms might attend to interests of both crop owners and graz-
ers.90 However, in most of these circumstances, the interests encompass a relatively 
narrow sphere of individuals with frequent contact, sharing of information, and rough 
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 87. Ellickson, supra note 85, at 94. 
 88. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES, 
56–57 (1991) (chronicling—as a foundational and influential study—the informal property 
rules of a ranching community in Shasta County, California); see also Ellickson, supra note 
85, at 85–86. 
 89. See Pierson, 3 Cai. at 180. 
 90. The classical example states that as grazers begin to outnumber row croppers, the 
burden to construct fences falls on the latter. More recent assessments also consider risk-
spreading property regimes of pastoralists who prefer the diversification options that open 
lands provide them. See, e.g., Gary D. Thompson & Paul N. Wilson, Common Property as an 
Institutional Response to Environmental Variability, 12 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 10 (1994); 
ELLICKSON, supra note 85. 
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parity of power. The interests of the hunted nonhuman animals, not surprisingly, lay 
light-years beyond the bounds of these rules. So too do the interests of human whale 
watchers, beach goers, or novelists.91  
Some decentralized property regimes might conceivably encompass broader in-
terests not immediately represented or even readily apparent to holders of power. We 
could term these “stewardship regimes,” although the distinction is not complete. 
Public zoos across the United States, for example, are increasingly treating their an-
imals in ways that acknowledge the animals’ emotional and physical needs in addi-
tion to their entertainment value.92 In 2004, the Detroit Zoo let go of its only ele-
phants, Winky and Wanda, because it was unable to construct the 20-acre enclosure 
that would have been large enough for the ailing elephants’ needs.93 A zoo memo-
randum explained that Winky and Wanda had evolved to travel up to thirty miles per 
day, and that their relatively cramped quarters in Detroit had left them with severe 
arthritis.94 They were sent to a 30-acre enclosure at a refuge in California where, 
ideally, they could live out their days in a more elephant-like manner.95 
It is unusual for a zoo to willingly transfer flagship personalities. The charisma 
and presence of such creatures is a major selling point to zoo goers, especially young 
visitors who may influence family decision making whether or not they appreciate 
the welfarist reasons that Winky and Wanda needed to move to California. Detroit 
zoo officials were reportedly the first to relinquish such marquee animals out of vol-
untary regard for the animals’ well being.96 However, other zoos are following suit 
with a host of similarly motivated managerial decisions. For instance, many zoos are 
using enclosures with more natural plants and other sight obstructions that improve 
animals’ experiences even at the cost of reducing their visibility to human visitors.97 
More broadly, as Irus Braverman describes in her masterful study of North American 
zoos, “the human stance of domination and control toward animals has been re-
defined as one of care and stewardship.”98  
These decisions may indeed be acceptable to contemporary zoo goers, but they 
clearly make sacrifices for the sake of constituents not directly represented in patron 
surveys, donor reports, or board membership. Stewardship might be said to exist in 
accepting such interests that are not merely derivative of those immediately repre-
sented, including those of children, animals, future generations, or other 
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unenfranchised groups. More modestly, a sort of nested stewardship could occur 
where the interests of those unenfranchised groups grow embedded in the interests 
of acknowledged stakeholders. 
Stewardship in this way is not inimical to structures of property ownership. In 
fact, stewardship, so conceived, depends critically on many of the “incidents of 
ownership”99 that Tony Honoré famously laid out. It does not demand a relinquish-
ment or giving over, but instead an active use and possession of the familiar sort, 
albeit focused on a larger set of interests than classically assumed.100 Without such 
traditional incidents of ownership, the steward’s goals would be unreachable under 
the general framework of government assumed in the liberal legal tradition. If the 
Smithsonian National Zoo lacked control over its pandas—including, it must be said, 
their reproductive organs—the Zoo would be powerless to effect its goal of breeding 
captive pandas.101 Similarly, if the Nature Conservancy did not own millions of acres 
of land and easements to that land, it would be an ineffective steward of those re-
sources. The choice to exploit fossil fuels on its land may be a controversial deci-
sion,102 but the power to make that choice, one way or another, is necessary to effec-
tuate the Conservancy’s mission of stewardship. 
Ultimately, if ownership and stewardship are a dichotomy, each end of that di-
chotomy requires the other to exist. Stewardship requires some sense of control, and 
ownership requires sustainability and prudence for the fruits of that ownership to be 
realized. Even the animal owner who wishes nothing more than to consume his catch 
depends on a breeding stock that is not similarly devoured. Hence, the libertarian 
separatist can no more shed dependence on a well-stewarded commons than the self-
less steward can avoid the mantle of domination. The Thompsons’ caretaker, John 
Moore, revealed something of this dialectic when he described his anguish at having 
to help tally bodies for Muskingum County Sheriff officials the morning after Terry 
Thompson’s death: “When you feed [the animals] every day and you water them and 
play with them and they respond to your love for them and love you back, how hard 
do you think that is?”103 Moore’s words speak of stewardship in pursuit of shared 
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existence and requited love, even as the animals’ need for feeding and watering re-
veals their subjugation under human ownership.104 
SUBJECTS OF THE STATE 
Stewardship is not a legal regime, nor can its tenets satisfactorily prevent the harm 
that arose in Zanesville on October 19, 2011. These concerns are more directly ad-
dressed by regulatory regimes of the kind passed in Ohio, but these regulatory re-
gimes also impose a harm or deprivation on the class of regulated activities and per-
sons. In the spring of 2012, in the legislative session immediately after the Zanesville 
tragedy, the Ohio General Assembly, with John Kasich’s signature, passed the 
Dangerous Wild Animal Act.105 The law’s central elements outlaw the sale, posses-
sion, breeding, and acquisition of dangerous wild animals—a category including 
wolves, great cats, bears, alligators, other large mammals and reptiles, and most non-
human primates.106 Members of the Association of Zoos and Aquariums (AZA) and 
the Zoological Association of America (ZAA) are exempted from the law.107 Pre-
existing owners of dangerous wild animals may not breed, acquire, or sell these ani-
mals, and they may continue owning them only if they also register their animals, 
pay a substantial annual permit fee, pass a criminal background check, embed micro-
chips in the animals’ bodies, own sufficiently sized and equipped animal shelters, 
adopt a plan of action in case of escape, and demonstrate proof of appropriate training 
and experience to house, feed, and handle the animals.108 Sterilization of certain dan-
gerous male animals is also required unless a qualified veterinarian opines that steri-
lization is medically contraindicated.109 No new licenses would be issued for those 
wishing to raise or sell members of the defined category of beings named dangerous 
wild animals.110  
The new statute not only regulated an activity, it prohibited a type of property 
ownership that was practically endemic in Ohio due to its previously lax limitations, 
that is, the avocational creation and maintenance of large exotic animal assemblages. 
If Mt. Hope had not taken itself out of the business of fostering the sale of dangerous 
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wild animals in Ohio, it would have been forced out. The owners themselves, of 
bears, tigers, cape buffaloes, wild African dogs, etc., would need to comply with the 
new Ohio regulations or seek accreditation with the AZA or ZAA as an alternative 
private compliance method.111 In practice, people like Terry Thompson would have 
to get big or get out. Accredited zoos require much more infrastructure and costs than 
Thompson’s operation.112 Without an exemption, owners would see their collection 
steadily dwindle through death or confiscation.113 Anticipating the law’s effects, the 
state of Ohio constructed an animal-containment facility to temporarily house seized 
exotics a cost of $2.9 million.114 The era of Terry Thompsons was coming to an end 
via regulation, their animals transferred to state oversight and care.  
Noting the reciprocal harms addressed and created by this regulation, we see in 
Zanesville a process whereby individuals surrendered to the authority of the state, 
but only after protestations of violence, ala Terry Thompson, or nonviolent legal ac-
tions. Exemplifying the latter, aggrieved exotic animal owners filed suit in 2012, 
seeking an injunction against the new Ohio law and a declaration that its require-
ments violate constitutional rights to speech, property, and due process.115 The record 
of the case is instructive, as it documents plaintiffs’ expressions of the deprivation at hand.  
In their complaint, the plaintiffs argued that the law’s onerous permitting require-
ments, coupled with the exemption from those requirements for accredited members 
of the AZA or the ZAA, compelled them to subsidize the speech of, and associate 
with, organizations they deemed objectionable.116 Subsumed in the legal argument, 
however, is a claim that Ohio was quashing an exercise of property rights of extreme 
personal significance to the plaintiffs. The state of Ohio candidly admitted that the 
permitting requirements under its new scheme were far more exacting than 
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2012) (No. 12-1010). 
 116. Id. at 12–14. 
2016] LIVING WITH OWNING  349 
 
analogous accreditation criteria for the AZA or the ZAA.117 Thus, to plaintiff exotic 
animal owners, Ohio was forcing them either to surrender ownership of their be-
loveds or to join an associational guild they found distasteful.118 Even “liquidation” 
of the animals—not that the plaintiffs desired it—was unavailable due to the new 
law’s transfer and breeding restrictions, which rendered the animals economically 
valueless. These various serpentine incursions, so offensive to libertarian sensibili-
ties, were all the more galling given that the plaintiffs, for their part, sincerely be-
lieved that their backyard republics represented a more perfect union, one inclusive 
of threatened and maligned creatures that “people don’t understand.”119 
The plaintiffs lost at both the district and appellate court levels.120 At the appellate 
level, the court was quick to rule that the AZA/ZAA exemptions did not exert an 
unconstitutional pull on private, unassociated owners, given the availability of other 
regulatory compliance options, such as exemptions for circuses, research facilities, 
or “educational institutions that display a single dangerous wild animal as a sports 
mascot.”121 The court failed to acknowledge that these exemptions were useless to 
plaintiffs and simply represented the comparative lobbying strength of the exempted 
organizations. No such political clout existed for plaintiffs, who the appellate court 
identified somewhat derisively as “self-described exotic animal enthusiasts.”122  
This primarily avocational nature of plaintiffs’ pursuit weighed heavily against 
them: As the Sixth Circuit noted, “In compelled subsidy cases, plaintiffs have gen-
erally been presented with a binary choice between subsidizing speech or quitting 
their jobs.”123 The panel did not address the fact that, for plaintiffs, “jobs” might 
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simply be an instrumental means toward their primary life end of building and sus-
taining community with nonhuman animals. This deprivation is not speculative or 
insubstantial: in the future, plaintiffs’ encounters with such creatures will only occur 
within distanced, mediated contexts such as zoos and other approved institutions. In 
such contexts, where fear and intimacy have been carefully minimized, plaintiffs 
might legitimately question whether exotic animals can produce an authentic expe-
rience of the sublime—which, on the most charitable interpretation, is the aim of 
their enthusiasm.124 
Plaintiffs fared no better with their argument that the state’s requirement of im-
plantation of a passive integrated transponder (PIT) chip under the skin of living 
animals constitutes a compensable physical taking of private property. In the Sixth 
Circuit panel’s view, such a requirement did not involve government occupation or 
a government-authorized occupation by a third party. Instead, the regulations were 
viewed as being akin to requirements for “license plates on cars, warning labels on 
packaging, lighting on boats, handrails in apartment buildings, and ramps leading to 
restaurants.”125 This result seemed ordained notwithstanding testimony from plain-
tiffs’ experts that some elderly animals might die during the anesthesia procedure 
required prior to implanting the animals with microchips.126 The plaintiffs’ fateful 
mistake on this score was to argue the case as a physical, rather than a regulatory, 
taking. To the appellate panel, the possibility of an offensive physical occupation just 
did not register: “[E]ven after appellants implant the microchips, they retain the abil-
ity to use and possess their animals and the implanted microchips.”127 
Giorgio Agamben’s notion of “bare life”128 here finds vivid illustration: Excluded 
from subjecthood, exposed to bodily violation, and rendered perfectly legible to the 
state, exotics under the new regime seem perfectly assimilated to the property form, 
no different from the digital wafer embedded under their skin. Indeed, the animals 
hardly seem to be animate property at all, let alone sovereign lives capable of holding 
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2016] LIVING WITH OWNING  351 
 
secrets even the state cannot know. At trial, the state’s experts testified at length re-
garding the public benefits of “microchipping” and “traceability” for potentially dan-
gerous animals, focusing on issues of identification, containment, and disease con-
trol.129 Plaintiffs’ experts, in contrast, emphasized the potential pain and health risks 
to the animals themselves from undergoing microchip implantation. The Sixth 
Circuit, for its part, elided the question of animal pain and subjecthood simply by 
stressing that the procedure is “commonly used.”130 
Here, as elsewhere,131 epistemic debates purportedly rooted in science and empir-
icism seem also to work as theaters for the expression of social values, anxieties, and 
commitments. Dr. Stull—the state’s expert, confident that he could anesthetize a 
sixteen-year-old African lion even though he had never personally examined it132 
—represented technocratic expertise and all those who see their position validated 
and enhanced through its authority. The plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Jo Anne Green, in 
contrast represented the relatively voiceless, including, in this litigation, those private 
individuals who own legally voiceless exotic animals. Dr. Green sought to validate 
the wisdom and experience of the plaintiff caretakers by dismissing the need for 
technocratic tracking devices. Speaking of plaintiff Cyndi Huntsman and her two 
elderly big cats, Dr. Green opined: “[Huntsman] has a history of both of the animals. 
She knows where they came from and how long they have been there. I don’t see any 
reason to PIT tag those animals.”133 Dr. Green contrasted Huntsman’s familiar, lov-
ing stewardship with the state’s “quite painful” intervention, which would necessitate 
“inserting a 14 gauge needle under the animal’s skin.”134 Speaking of the elderly cats, 
she opined that the state’s prescription “would be cruel and unjustified.”135 
This attempt to speak for the voiceless necessitated a response from the state’s 
experts, one of whom confidently claimed, “I have microchipped many animals who 
didn’t even notice anything was happening.”136 The problem of other other minds137 
was here on full display. Unlike philosophers and scientists, the legal system cannot 
withhold judgment pending further evidence and analysis, even with respect to un-
answerable questions. Through the conjuring magic of burdens of proof and stand-
ards of review, plaintiffs’ claims failed,138 as did their appeal. A request for a rehear-
ing in the Sixth Circuit was denied, after which the plaintiffs presumably accepted, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 129. Wilkins, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 529. 
 130. Wilkins, 744 F.3d at 411. 
 131. See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE 
L. & POL’Y REV. 149 (2006). 
 132. See Wilkins, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 530. 
 133. Id. at 527. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 529 (Dr. Paul Stull, D.V.M, Assistant Chief, Division of Animal Health, Ohio 
Department of Agriculture). 
 137. See J.D. Singer, Sharing the Flesh of the World: Merleau-Ponty and the Problem of 
Animal Minds (Mar. 12, 2011) (Metaphysical Society of America 62nd Annual Meeting 
Aristotle Prize paper), http://www.metaphysicalsociety.org/2011/Session%20XI.Singer.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JE6G-4463]. 
 138. The district court judge was particularly candid in noting the harm wrought by the act, 
despite its constitutionality: 
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albeit with regret, that the rule of law had definitively ruled against them. They had 
been forced to surrender control to the sovereign, and to the sovereign’s delegates.139  
Terry Thompson presents an alternative to the plaintiffs’ legal, nonviolent mode 
of objection. On a deep level, he never surrendered complete control to the state, 
although his last acts did subordinate his body and property to the state while simul-
taneously expressing defiance. Like the other exotic-animal owners, Terry also sur-
rendered control through a lifetime of organized transactions, as is necessary to co-
exist with one’s peers and survive in the modern nation state. While the prospect of 
implanting tracking chips into humans, rather than animals, remains a distant dysto-
pian future, control is ceded in far more mundane and multifarious ways. Driver’s 
licenses, insurance requirements, traffic signs, language conventions, and attendant 
behavioral proprieties—by limiting oneself to these customs and laws, we gain the 
ability to travel, work, interact, and generally not provoke or agitate one another, 
through a set of shared expectations. More fundamentally, we guarantee each other 
a greater freedom from harm by limiting our potentially harmful actions. Those 
harmful actions run the gamut from driving on the left side of the road, to murder, to 
waste dumping, to releasing nonhuman animals thought to be dangerous. To avoid 
the consequences of these deeds, we collectively agree to refrain from perpetrating them.  
Likewise, we surrender control when we construct bureaucracies and technocra-
cies for the collective good, recognizing the harms that are afflicted as well. When 
granting power to an agency, Congress—in the name of us—admits that we cannot 
control essential functions of our state and its economy democratically: setting envi-
ronmental, health, and safety standards; regulation of banking or labor markets; pro-
vision of social services; and so on. On the first motion, we surrender partial control 
to our families and local communities. On the second, we surrender control to politi-
cal systems. In the modern state, we yield to a third, surrendering control to techno-
cratic agencies, admitting that we do not have enough information, expertise, or time 
to oversee those who make decisions nominally on our behalf.140 This line tracks 
technocracy as the outgrowth of democracy, rather than the enemy of it. Liberal de-
mocracy and the market economy enabled, or at least accompanied, extraordinary 
growth in commerce, technology, and society, so much so that technocracy, in turn, 
                                                                                                                 
 
As a final matter, the Court notes that it is sympathetic to the exotic animal own-
ers who will not be able to retain possession of their beloved animals as a result 
of the operation of the Act, and it recognizes that the circumstance may lead to 
the severance of strong bonds between the animals and their owners. 
Wilkins, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 544. 
 139. Lost in the proceedings was an opportunity to consider the animals’ interests directly, 
rather than through the related constitutional claims of their owners. Grappling head-on with 
the state’s desire for “traceability” might have been useful judicial practice for more worri-
some efforts by the state in the future to categorize and control “bare life.” For valuable discus-
sion along those lines, see the works gathered in REFRAMING RIGHTS: BIOCONSTITUTIONALISM 
IN THE GENETIC AGE (Sheila Jasanoff ed., 2011). 
 140. See FRANK J. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION: A STUDY IN GOVERNMENT 
85 (1900) (“The fact is, then, that there is a large part of administration which is unconnected 
with politics, which should therefore be relieved very largely, if not altogether, from the con-
trol of political bodies. It is unconnected with politics because it embraces fields of semi-
scientific, quasi-judicial and quasi-business or commercial activity—work which has little if 
any influence on the expression of the true state will.”) (emphasis in original). 
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has arisen to respond to their complexities. The Nightwatchmen’s State so well 
breeds freedom, we might say, that it must quicken and adapt to tame its offspring.141 
TRAVERSING THE GULF 
Control plays out in fraught and sometimes fatal ways in the context of exotic-
animal ownership. Note that Brent Kandra—the twenty-four-year-old who died of a 
bear attack in August 2010, triggering the executive order which had lapsed by the 
time of Terry Thompson’s death—also bonded with the animals he cared for, includ-
ing the bear that killed him. “It’s one that he played with constantly, every time that 
he was here,” Sam Mazzola said.142 The familiarity was not enough to avert disaster. 
Brent died of blunt and sharp injuries. The bear was out of its cage for its usual feed-
ing. Sam Mazzola was the only witness. He had to blast a fire extinguisher on the 
bear to drive it back into the metal structure. That the bear’s provocation was un-
known challenges the limits of our empathy. “We don’t know whether something 
startled the bear or what prompted the bear to get aggressive with the caretaker,” 
Lorain County Sheriff’s Capt. James Drozdowski said.143 If Kandra knew of the 
bear’s trigger, of course, he might have evaded the attack.  
Here, and in other instances,144 a gulf of language between us and our nonhuman 
counterparts aggravates the problem of interspecies stewardship. We have cultural 
heroes and heroines who seek to traverse that gulf, bringing back ethnographies of 
our nonhuman kin. Jane Goodall is only the most visible example: hundreds of be-
havioral biologists have sought to transcribe the wants, needs, desires, fears, ail-
ments, aspirations, and anxieties of nonhumans.145 Even so, the gulf of language and 
experience remains and has for millennia served as a blockade on empathy and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 141. We hasten to add a final and most inescapable dependency: the control wielded by 
nature over the conditions for life’s existence. Through human invention and management, we 
seek constantly to expand the possible frontier of nature’s bounty. We succeed to such a degree 
that some imagine us actually liberated from nature’s limits. Those thoughts too depend on 
phosphorous. Cf. Jacob Moleschott. ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica 
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 142. Unless otherwise specified, for the following information pertaining to Brent Kandra 
and Sam Mazzola, see Sheeran, supra note 14. 
 143. Id. 
 144. In 2009, a two-hundred-pound chimpanzee with no history of violence brutally at-
tacked a woman in Connecticut that the chimp had known for years. Officials speculated that 
the attack was prompted by the woman significantly changing her hairstyle such that the chimp 
mistook her for an intruder. Andy Newman, Pet Chimpanzee Attacks Woman in Connecticut, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/17/world/americas/17iht-chimp 
.1.20241928.html [https://perma.cc/CE2Q-67T2]. Later, a theory surfaced that the chimp was 
carrying Lyme disease, which, in rare circumstances, can cause psychosis. Andy Newman & 
Anahad O’Connor, Woman Mauled by Chimp Is Still in Critical Condition, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
17, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/18/nyregion/18chimp.html [https://perma.cc 
/78XA-JF94]. The true cause of the attack seems likely to have died with the chimpanzee, 
Travis, who was shot on the scene after a Xanax-laced tea provided by its owner failed to 
subdue the animal. 
 145. See generally CARL SAFINA, BEYOND WORDS: WHAT ANIMALS THINK AND FEEL (2015). 
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stewardship.146 In that respect, the problem of other other minds is foundational to 
ethics, politics, and law. It haunts the liberal vision of equal regard in just the right 
way, exposing a gap between aspiration and action as vast and gnawing as a 
slaughterhouse.147 
Terry Thompson sought to defy that gap in his singular way, but his empathy was 
compromised. While he created something of a human-nonhuman world, he did not 
do so through careful study of animal signs, vocalizations, and behaviors. His means 
of defying the lexical gap was as most companion animal owners’: through physical 
contact and unilateral, despotic assumption of a custodial role. This is not to say that 
the kingdom lacked intimacy. In local footage aired later on ABC news, Thompson 
is seen giving his hand to a black bear who mouths on it, as if it were a pacifier.148 
Marian was known to let one of the Celebes crested macaques share her bed at 
night.149 News coverage of these familial relationships took on a pornographic air 
when covered nationally,150 a form of intrusion that, like ATF raids and tax liens, 
cannot contain its consequences.  
Intrusions or none, the upshot is that the Thompsons’ “babies” were swimming in 
a pool with no water: a financially troubled operation that was headed towards insol-
vency. At his death, Terry had nearly $70,000 in unpaid taxes outstanding and fifty-
six exotic animal mouths to feed, plus the mouths of other farm animals and dogs, 
his farm hand to pay, and his own needs to attend to.151 Up until his death, there 
appear to be no reported attacks initiated by these tigers, lions, bears, or monkeys. 
Perhaps the Thompson’s threadbare operation provided just enough empathic leader-
ship to avert prior disaster.152 Perhaps as well, his sacrifice was genuine: His offer to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 146. It bears asking whether successful stewardship requires or approximates empathy. In 
turn, if empathy requires envisioning the other’s thought process, it bears asking whether we 
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 147. See DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 195–97 (2010). 
 148. Good Morning America (ABC television broadcast Oct. 21, 2011), http://abcnews.go 
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 149. See Heath, supra note 67. 
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 151. See Kelly Mills, Still Problems with Kopchak Road Farm, WHIZ NEWS (May 2, 2012), 
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[https://perma.cc/LQ4B-BAF8]. 
 152. Remarkably, even during the release, hunt, and transfer of the animals on Terry 
Thompson’s farm, the only human injury reported was an agent whose hearing was partially 
lost due to the incessant sonic blasts of gunfire during the hunt. See Jones, supra note 1. As 
journalist Chris Jones put it, “Depending on your proximity to Zanesville, Ohio, and your 
feelings about the relative value of animal life, what happened at the farm was either one of 
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at a gay Orlando night club has since surpassed all other mass shootings in the United States, 
with forty-nine dead and fifty-three wounded. 49 Killed at Orlando Gay Nightclub in Worst 
Mass Shooting in U.S. History, CHI. TRIB. (June 12, 2016, 10:53 PM), http://www. 
chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-orlando-nightclub-shooting-20160612-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/4U69-A7WN]. 
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take in orphans of other exotic animal owners seems—at least partially—directed 
toward some vaguely glimpsed vision of interspecies community. In this light, his 
willingness to take on insurmountable financial obligations can be read as a willing 
exposure to risk for the sake of others. However, in exposing himself, Thompson 
exposed his animals to risk as well.  
Thompson’s case therefore clarifies that sacrifice alone does not fulfill the role of 
stewardship. One can sacrifice in the name of others but still harm their interests. 
Neither does volunteering alone constitute good stewardship. It was Thompson’s ex-
cessive volunteering of his resources to other burdened exotic animal owners that 
hastened his defeat. Many commentators, including Jack Hanna and Terry’s sister 
Polly, came to view Terry’s final actions as driven in part by his financial straits.153 
With this burden in mind, Polly Thompson offered the unsettling vision of Terry 
Thompson at the end of his life, “looking at every animal, thinking, ‘How am I going 
to do this?’”154 She envisioned him “standing on that hill,” thinking, “Nobody wants 
me,”155 as if he were occupying the same role that his animals did before he acquired 
them: orphaned and out of place in the peopled communities of rural Ohio. True or 
apocryphal, these visions mirror a deeply troubled Thompson, who failed as a stew-
ard in spite of—or perhaps hastened by—the efforts of local authorities. 
HERE’S THE THING 
In their respective enterprises, Ohio’s exotic-animal owners had their avocations 
and even sense of selfhood at stake.156 The freedom to build one’s own creative king-
dom is nowhere in the Declaration of Independence or the Constitution, but it can 
easily be seen to emerge from the rights enumerated in those documents. To many 
of Thompson’s kind, the threads of life, liberty, and property do not separate. Indeed, 
property ownership is arguably a necessary element of identity formation in modern 
societies.157 Terry Thompson, Sam Mazzola, and others take this sense of identity in 
property to impressive and highly visual proportions, given the nature and size of 
their collections. It is common to drive past rural homesteads and see similar 
collections, often of nonfunctioning vehicles. In southern Missouri towns, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 153. See Welsh-Huggins & Seewer, supra note 64. 
 154. Id. Polly assented to the unfortunate role of testifying against her brother during his 
trial for animal welfare violations. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156.  See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982) 
(articulating a contemporary personhood perspective as a theory of and basis for some property 
rights). For a chilling reinterpretation of Professor Radin’s personhood theory with potential 
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 157. See ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL 
PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES (1961) (finding that the inmates who were deprived of posses-
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decommissioned school buses are the special token seen in many people’s lawns. In 
western Pennsylvania, some yards boast a fleet of weathered fishing boats perpetu-
ally awaiting restoration. These collections can become magnetic spectacles: An es-
timated three thousand fee-paying buyers and curiosity seekers showed up at the 
Thompsons’ farm when Marian held an auction of her dead husband’s sprawling 
collection.158 This role of property accumulation is not trivial; it shows a creative 
control that is more than just a means to a utilitarian end. This is why dispossession 
can be so severe an intrusion, even though the property lost may seem trivial or 
eccentric to others.159 
Still, when creative control is the primary or only end of one’s acquisitiveness, 
destruction can arise. The impossibility of complete control or the anticipation of 
artistic destruction may drive a willing embrace for the end. Terry Thompson’s taste 
for acquiring unwanted animals grew disproportionate to his resources. As his col-
lection grew, the guiding force of Terry’s habits seemed unmistakably to be empire 
building rather than caretaking. Those who transferred their exotic animals to him 
were reportedly distressed by the ramshackle operation. “They’d visit and see the 
situation and they’d freak out,” County Humane Officer David Durst said. “[T]hey’d 
call me. . . . [And t]hey’d say, ‘I was horrified.’”160 Although done with a promise of 
care, the acquisitions were driven by Terry’s penchant for oversized risk taking. He 
was also a speedboat record holder and was rumored to fly his crop duster below a 
local highway overpass.161 In this frame, Thompson’s operation was indifferent to 
the possibility of collapse, or even encouraging of it. As evidenced by his frequent 
statements to that effect, Terry had destruction in mind as a final creative pathway 
for a sustained period of time. 
The day before he released the animals, Thompson told John Moore he had a plan 
to address his marital problems, adding, “[Y]ou will know it when it happens.”162 In 
his final act—when it happened—Thompson was an artist, deranged, that captured 
the imagination of the country and the world through his destructive performance. 
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A BID FOR CHAOS 
Thompson’s ultimate means of creative destruction, and indeed self-necessitated 
vengeance, was an unpublicized artwork at first. The first person to notice anything 
wrong on that day in October was Sam Kopchak, Thompson’s neighbor.163 Kopchak 
was walking his Arabian-pinto horse, Red, to the barn for the night when the horse 
bolted uncharacteristically. Red’s behavior tipped Kopchak off to the broader dis-
turbance he had not yet seen: horses in the nearby field circling proximally to the 
dark figure of a bear. The equine maelstrom was an omen. After securing Red in 
hand, Kopchak turned and started walking to the barn. He froze. An African lion 
stood fifteen feet to his left, its face against a wire fence that was the only barrier 
between it and Kopchak and his horse. The latter two made it to the barn, walking 
briskly and calmly, without inciting the lion to test that barrier. 
Ultimately, however, it was the exotics that lost in this game of composure. When 
Sheriff Matt Lutz, Sergeant Steve Blake, and Deputy Jonathan Merry arrived after a 
calm but insistent call from the Kopchaks’ house, they began tracking down escapees 
one by one. A lioness was shot under a neighbor’s porch after it bared its teeth at 
Merry, its pursuer. Likewise, a black bear charged Merry in Fred Polk’s driveway 
and was shot and killed at a distance of less than twenty feet. Merry and his col-
leagues killed two more lions, a tiger, and a wolf in the early going, with another 
forty-three large exotic animals to fall in the ensuing hours. 
Overnight and through the next day, rain set in as the world learned of Terry 
Thompson and his defunct menagerie. Highway signs on Interstate 70 flashed the 
surreal warning, “CAUTION EXOTIC ANIMALS,” and the sheriff’s men hunted 
into the night a scared and disoriented flock of animals meant for other lands. John 
Moore, the Thompsons’ animal caretaker, was enlisted to help find the animals, doc-
ument their deaths, and identify them by their bodies. Many asked why tranquilizers 
were not used to bring down the animals, and the popular media mistakenly reported 
that eighteen of the dead were rare Bengal tigers. Sedation was virtually impossible, 
animal handlers including Jack Hanna explained. Tranquilizers act on a delay, and 
animals often charge in response to being shot by such darts. Regardless, John Moore 
asserts that up to six cats were shot in locked cages, including a pregnant tiger close 
to giving birth to her cubs.164 Another twelve animals shot by law enforcement were 
less than a year old and nondangerous in Moore’s view.165 Despite these criticisms 
from a not-disinterested Moore, most commentators have supported the decisions 
and actions of the law enforcement officers. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 163. Unless otherwise specified, for information pertaining to the night of Terry’s death 
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358 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:327 
 
The dangers were well apparent to Barb Wolfe, a veterinarian affiliated with the 
Columbus Zoo, who assisted law enforcement officers on the night of the animal 
release. When a tiger was located the following morning loose and alive in some 
trees, Wolfe attempted to tranquilize the beast. After slowly creeping to within fifteen 
feet of the tiger, she raised her rifle and shot a dart into its hide. Someone observing 
from a distance shouted in excitement after she hit her target. The noise startled the 
tiger, which leapt to its feet and charged Wolfe. She tried to retreat but became 
snagged in brush, at which point Jay Lawhorne, a former marine and SWAT team 
member who had helped lead the overnight hunt, unloaded several rounds into the 
charging tiger, enabling Wolfe to escape. Ten minutes later Wolfe crept back into 
the woods to find the tiger still alive and conscious. At that point, “Lawhorne raised 
his M4 to his shoulder, and he pulled the trigger, and the last Zanesville tiger finally 
fell, the sound of the bullets echoing between the trees.”166 
Intentionally or not, Thompson had weaponized his animals in the eyes of the law. 
Most were shot as they emerged from darkness or enclosures in a state of panic and 
agitation. The moment of chaos extended for hours, and the officers doubted their 
ability to protect the land beyond Thompson’s gate, where other animals and their 
children were bedding down for the night. 
THE ABSENT STEWARD 
Terry Thompson had lived through Vietnam. He knew what carnage looked like. 
But he did not see the carnage he created: officers shooting the flesh off tigers to 
retrieve Terry’s splintered body, narcotics experts firing at the flaming thermal image 
of a grizzly in the night—imagery that would torment the responders for months and 
even years afterward. Thompson shot himself sometime before four thirty in the af-
ternoon. He made no immediate indication to his friends what he would do that day. 
At his sentencing a year before, he allegedly promised to “let all [his] animals loose 
and then blow [his] brains out.”167 But he was silent on that intention nearer to the 
day of his death. John Moore, his farm hand, had talked with Thompson on the phone 
for two hours the morning of the event. Thompson reportedly left saying “[s]ee you 
tonight at five-thirty.”168 Moore, instead, was one of the first to see Thompson dead, 
with a gunshot wound in his throat, a bite mark on his head, and his pelvis in shreds. 
Thompson had smeared himself with chicken guts before he shot himself. A 
“Buckeye” tiger had taken Thompson’s invitation and was ripping the flesh from his 
crotch. 
The final act of sacrifice was vintage Terry Thompson: absurd, messy, a memorial 
unto itself. He created an image of hell that his animals and their pursuers could not 
escape. One commentator likened his scattered beasts to “deeply disoriented carousel 
animals whose creators had deserted them.”169 One bear, a former involuntary enter-
tainer, was shot as it clung to the heights of a telephone pole. Others wandered aim-
lessly only to charge when they were confronted and then brought down with bullets. 
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One of the monkeys, likely bearing hepatitis, was eaten by a tiger. At the end of the 
carnage, only six animals were recaptured alive. The rest were buried in a mass grave 
on the Thompson farm. Terry had cursed and killed his kingdom as he died himself, 
part eaten by his beloved. 
Perversely Christlike, Thompson’s chicken-gut surrender is barbaric in a way that 
only animal sacrifice can echo. Fresh raw meat of any source claims a wildness most 
of us are not prepared to accept as nourishment. Thompson became that wildness. 
His sinews broke in the mouth of a tiger before the first of his animals would be shot. 
The only power left to Thompson was to relinquish control and let his kingdom col-
lapse. Marian had left him. The state had subjugated his life, first with the trauma of 
an ATF raid then through the orderly proceeding of a court. Thompson’s private 
kingdom had been orchestrated with such a high degree of control that its resulting 
chaos was only a natural unwinding. It was as if a dam had been breached. Thompson 
said his last rites as water rushed through cracks he had created with bolt cutters, a 
Magnum revolver, and a dream of wildness. 
Marian Thompson was not present to be swept away by the deluge. Thompson 
shot himself while she was out of state on horse-training work. Marian had allegedly 
left Terry for another man while Terry was in prison. Despite that choice, she was 
the one to come home to Kopchak Road, keep house, and take care of the remaining 
animals after the breach. After the Dangerous Wild Animal Act was passed, Marian 
duly registered those five animals.170 She also paid off the back taxes on the 
Muskingum County Animal Farm and fought for, and won, the return of forty weap-
ons that were confiscated from Terry under federal firearms charges. Marian strate-
gically avoided media attention in the days and months after the release. After secur-
ing the return of her remaining animals, which had been sent to the Columbus Zoo 
in the immediate aftermath of Terry’s breakdown, Marian did send an email to local 
press indicating that she would write a book on the episode. John Moore, the animal 
caretaker for the Thompsons, wrote one himself with little fanfare.171 
Absent Marian’s view, the story remains one dominated by male voices: Terry 
Thompson, John Moore the caretaker, Johnathan Merry the deputy, the judge in 
Thompson’s sentencing, Fred Polk the neighbor, Jack Hanna, and Chris Jones and 
Chris Heath who wrote feature-length articles on the massacre in Esquire and GQ 
respectively. The exceptions to this rule are Kathy Thompson, a local journalist, and 
Terry’s sister Polly, who testified against Terry in his animal welfare trial and spoke 
to reporters after his death.172 Marian was also, problematically, the one whose per-
sonal privacy was the most violated by the ATF raid as she stood exposed for the 
entirety of the raid, given no opportunity to properly clothe herself while agents 
swept the house. In the fuller story, she transcends the role that otherwise is pinned 
to her: the traumatized wife of the suicidal Thompson, the female body that was ex-
posed by the raid. We do not know more of her role because of her understandable 
decision to limit her exposure. We do know that financially and physically, Marian 
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bore the burden of establishing normalcy in a place that was publicly scarred by her 
husband’s ultimately selfish actions. 
Thompson’s selfishness is visible even in acts that purport to kindness or self-
sacrifice. In his final offering, a symbol of perverted love, Thompson baited his ani-
mals to a certain death. Any animal that fed on him would be marked and killed for 
having tasted human flesh. More broadly, the fact of Thompson’s death was likely 
to lead to a fatal end for all of his released charges: For one, the erstwhile hunters 
would have a palpable image of their own mortality and that of the nearby human 
residents they were meant to protect. Secondarily, without the mystical guiding hand 
of Thompson, the response team was unlikely to trust Moore or any other trainer to 
secure the animals alive, whether or not they had fed on illicit meat. Thompson’s act 
of release was meant to be irreversible: Cages were compromised such that they 
ceased to be a haven for those animals who might otherwise have survived the night. 
No refuge would be safe. Few bodies would be spared. 
Further, with the sacrifice of his own body, Thompson crossed the line of lan-
guage and of empathy heretofore discussed as dividing the species. He violated a 
sacrosanct directionality of meat implicit in our Western morality systems: Humans 
can eat nonhuman animals, but no one can eat human flesh. It is important to note 
that Terry’s attempted transubstantiation was seemingly done out of love for himself, 
rather than for his animals. Even in releasing his nonhuman animals and killing him-
self, Terry exercised creative-destructive control. Although they walked “free” for a 
matter of hours, their fates were sealed. Although they ate of his flesh, they did so at 
his direction. Terry’s distorted vision of a unified kingdom, a mutual domain of hu-
man and nonhuman animal life, was premised on denying his animals those things 
which he possessed: autonomy, property, land, and environs he could shape to his 
desires. Their environs were derelict cages in muddy fields, a continent and an ocean 
away from the terrain where most of their species originated. 
The Dangerous Wild Animals Act may have averted the Zanesville, Ohio, animal 
massacre had it been in place in the 1990s and 2000s. Terry Thompson’s acquisition 
would have been limited more directly by the strictures of the law. Without auctions 
of exotic animals, excluded now by the law, the Muskingum County Animal Farm 
may have never existed. Terry’s first exotic animal, a lion cub named Simba that he 
purchased for Marian’s birthday, may have never been sold in Ohio. Instead, once 
Terry Thompson acquired his flock, our stewardship of him arguably became 
doomed to fail. Any effort to dispossess him of his nonhuman animals drove him to 
threats and violence. The state could have enacted a law against suicide by exotic 
animal release and gunshot. It could have enacted a law hastening removal of exotics 
from potentially offending parties. But, to John Kasich’s point,173 once Terry decided 
to break the law, deterrence was pointless and confiscation almost certainly would 
have been preempted by disaster. In this narrative of failed stewardship, what is miss-
ing is the state’s control.  
The state could not control Terry in the way that he controlled his animals. Short 
of seizing the animal Terry with a coordinated raid, the state had no power to dictate 
his immediate actions. Thus the tensile dichotomy breaks down here: where the 
state’s control of Terry never was, or was—but snapped. Likewise, we may question 
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how possible it is to successfully own or steward exotic animals in perpetuity, not-
withstanding the tens of thousands of large animals living in backyard cages through-
out the United States today. Control over exotic animals and other beings is not se-
cure unless, perhaps, we tame them. But in taming them, their being is changed. To 
capture its motion, we grasp a spinning coin. To feel free, some must see only 
death.174 
SPEAKING IN WILD TONGUES 
Stewardship and ownership need the wisdom and control, respectively, of each to 
meet the goals of either. The other oppositions present in this story—order-chaos, 
love-fear, democracy-technocracy, freedom-security—also are complex and inter-
twined. Behind walls of apparent order destructive pressure builds. In loving truly, 
we render ourselves vulnerable to fearsome pain and disappointment. A successful 
democracy could not function without deferring some decisions to unelected minds. 
Freedom from harm requires limitations on one’s own and others’ actions. Those 
limitations are themselves a type of harm. Real violence, for example, was perpe-
trated on Terry and Marian Thompson during the government’s ATF raid.175  
When acknowledging these poles and their coexistence, integrative thinking and 
perhaps religious guidance may be of some use: Religion, in its better shades, can 
offer individuals a means of accepting such dualities and limitations, or even ac-
knowledging, grappling with, and sometimes overcoming seemingly fated failures. 
At its worst, individuals can use religion to justify violence when their limited world 
is threatened. Thompson did not profess a religion, but the specific choice of his 
bodily sacrifice amounts to a religious act: it expresses meaning, perhaps transcend-
ent in Thompson’s eyes, through a ritual that has no clear economic import. Through 
the act, Thompson acknowledged, but lashed out at, a limitation on his life. It is an 
essential limitation: constraining one’s action to live in society, including close com-
munities and the broader regulatory state. At times, Thompson seemed willing in his 
life to accept other fundamental limitations: the kind necessary to live in relationship 
with one’s immediate kin. Kin here includes the fifty-six nonhuman residents in 
Thompson’s home. They were the only kin Thompson had left at Kopchak Road 
when Marian left. He loved them, selfishly but intensely, and too consumingly to 
keep Marian, and others, in his life. 
The distant world loved Thompson’s animals too, but was not willing to enter into 
their society unprotected. Kathy Thompson, a Zanesville reporter of no direct rela-
tion to Terry, had such intentions when she visited the Thompson’s property several 
years prior, anticipating that the big cats would be in cages. They were not: A full-
grown panther walked through Kathy’s legs and looked up at her while she idly 
watched Marian bottle feed a cougar. Kathy, to her own surprise, petted a Siberian 
                                                                                                                 
 
 174. See Rainer Maria Rilke, The Eighth Elegy, in THE POETRY OF RAINER MARIA RILKE 
39 (A.S. Kline trans., 2001) (“Since near to death one no longer sees death, and stares ahead, 
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tiger in the Thompsons’ yard. “I thought, I’m never going to have this opportunity 
again,” Kathy recounted about her visit to the Thompson’s.176 The latent power of 
these animals had thrilled her. In communing with them we become strangers to our-
selves as much as we become kin to the animals. Aldo Leopold understood the heart 
of this appeal when he described seeing the “fierce green fire dying” in the eyes of a 
wolf he had hunted.177 The fire was “something new to [him] . . . something known 
only to her and to the mountain.”178 Leopold was etching a new conservation ecol-
ogy. By narrating wolves’ role as a keystone species, he echoed an interconnected-
ness of things tracked by field notes and calculus. He also spoke to an intimacy in-
herent in our experience of predators. We love them because they threaten us like 
few other beings can. We experience an old adage in reverse: “Those who can hurt 
you, you may love the most.” 
Thompson undoubtedly knew this as well, but he failed to limit himself in ways 
that were necessary to keep his beloveds in his life and him in theirs. He did not 
operate by the rules of his neighbors, guilds, or government. Years after his death, it 
was Marian who put their house in order, while his ashes rested in an urn emblazoned 
with the American flag. His collection of guns was not only illegal, but inordinate; 
and his penchant for antics betrayed a sense of defiant separatism. When Thompson 
was released from prison he bought a bicycle from Walmart and rode it fifty miles 
home to 270 Kopchak Road instead of calling a friend or family member for a ride.179 
The decision echoed his walk home in a rainstorm from a local airstrip when he re-
turned from Vietnam, a veteran.180 Thompson reportedly felt betrayed by his country. 
(Who would not, brought home from indiscriminate horror to indiscriminate shame?) 
He was an isolated soul who had chosen not to play by the rules. His story calls us 
to consider how we reach those in universities, workplaces, small towns, and back-
woods who choose self-immolation over self-limitation. How do we alter the paths 
of those who risk self-destruction and violence when they feel unfree? 
Those questions notwithstanding, Terry Thompson can teach us where and how 
stewardship fails: when it operates ignorant of societal or physical limitations; when 
the “sovereign expressions of life”181—any life—go unacknowledged; when pride 
relinquishes responsibility to others out of spite. Further, the response to Thompson’s 
actions can teach us how stewardship incrementally moves forward: with greater 
complexity and attention to the needs of others; with heeding of self-limitations re-
quired for healthy relationships, communities, and political systems within which we 
may otherwise feel encaged; and with recognition that such self-limitation is actually 
necessary for any self-possession that can genuinely exist. 
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The slide into dysphoria had been long in the making for Zanesville. In the 
aftermath of the event, some of Terry Thompson’s neighbors recalled portents. Some 
described to reporters what it had felt like to be awakened at night by occasional 
spine-dusting screams from the Thompsons’ property, animalian sounds the neigh-
bors described as “unreal,” and we might add otherworldly.182 Although owned by 
Thompson, those animals belonged elsewhere. Their presence often seemed that of 
ghosts, even as the threat and suffering they represented was incarnate. Hence, the 
most basic lesson of the Zanesville saga: our neighbors’ screams are real and of this 
world. Only in language and other models can harms be “external.” 
The less basic lesson is harder to voice: violence is not expunged from legal or-
dering, even when premised on stewardship. But violence accompanied by recogni-
tion and respect is not reducible to chaos. Consider again Ohio’s newly promulgated 
exotic-animal ownership regime. By requiring fulfillment of stringent animal welfare 
standards or accreditation with zoological associations, Ohio’s statute moves toward 
a set of modified property rights that take into account a slightly larger sphere of 
interests: those of the nonhuman animals who have previously been treated little dif-
ferent from other kinds of ownable chattel. Although traced, micro-chipped, and 
other-ed by the law, they also are treated with the distance, space, and, yes, even fear 
that their selves and bodies command. Incorporating those dignity interests—even 
indirectly—is a movement at the edges of the liberal state, where democracies con-
sider the needs of those not formally present in deliberations or voting booths. 
Stewardship lies in that council. As it should: we should love those that speak in wild 
tongues, heeding limits we adopt at will to participate in our relationships, commu-
nities, democracies, and environments. 
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